The Justiciability of Eligibility: May Courts Decide Who Can Be President? by Tokaji, Daniel P.
Michigan Law Review First Impressions
Volume 107
2008
The Justiciability of Eligibility: May Courts Decide
Who Can Be President?
Daniel P. Tokaji
The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi
Part of the Courts Commons, Election Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the
President/Executive Department Commons
This Commentary is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review First Impressions by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Daniel P. Tokaji, The Justiciability of Eligibility: May Courts Decide Who Can Be President?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 31
(2008).
Available at: http://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr_fi/vol107/iss1/21
TOKAJI FI FTP1 PAGINATED_C.DOC 9/30/2008 10:59 AM 
 
31 
THE JUSTICIABILITY OF ELIGIBILITY: 
MAY COURTS DECIDE WHO 
CAN BE PRESIDENT? 
Daniel P. Tokaji* † 
Introduction 
The 2008 election cycle has been a busy one for legal disputes over the 
qualifications of presidential candidates, with federal cases having been 
filed to challenge both major candidates’ eligibility under the “natural born 
Citizen” clause. These cases unquestionably present vital questions of con-
stitutional law, touching on matters of self-evident national importance. It is 
doubtful, however, that they are justiciable in lower federal courts. Standing 
requirements and the political question doctrine make it unlikely that a fed-
eral court will reach the merits in cases of the type filed to date.  
That does not mean that all hope is lost for those seeking to challenge 
the eligibility of John McCain, Barack Obama, or future presidential candi-
dates. There are other avenues through which the issue might be 
adjudicated. The most plausible is an action in state court challenging an 
allegedly ineligible candidate’s access to the ballot, which would not present 
the same justiciability obstacles. Though state-court challenges to a presi-
dential candidate’s eligibility raise concerns about consistency and political 
bias, the U.S. Supreme Court’s appellate jurisdiction in such cases would 
provide a check against such abuses. In the event that a renegade state court 
wrongly disqualified a presidential candidate, or that there were an inter-
state conflict over a particular candidate’s eligibility, the Court would have a 
vitally important role to play in resolving the issue. Another possibility is 
that Congress could decide the eligibility of a presidential candidate through 
its constitutionally assigned role in counting Electoral College votes. The 
existence of these two alternative means to adjudicate a presidential candi-
date’s eligibility strengthens the arguments against the justiciability of the 
federal lawsuits filed to date.  
I. Federal Lawsuits Challenging Presidential Eligibility 
Three cases have challenged McCain’s eligibility on the ground that he 
is ineligible due to his birth in the Panama Canal Zone. The first case, 
                                                                                                                      
 * Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State University, Moritz College of Law; Associ-
ate Director, Election Law @ Moritz, http://electionlaw.osu.edu. Thanks to Jack Chin and Richard 
Winger for their comments, and to Ben Kington for his research assistance. 
 † Suggested citation: Daniel P. Tokaji, Commentary, The Justiciability of Eligibility: May 
Courts Decide Who Can Be President?, 107 Mich. L. Rev. First Impressions 31 (2008), 
http://www. michiganlawreview.org/firstimpressions/vol107/tokaji.pdf. 
TOKAJI FI FTP1 PAGINATED_C.DOC  9/30/2008 10:59 AM 
32 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 107:31 
 
Inland Empire Voters v. United States, was filed in the U.S. District Court 
for the Central District of California. The skeletal complaint alleged that 
McCain was ineligible to serve as President and sought declaratory relief, 
without providing any explanation of why the named plaintiffs had standing. 
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that case in April 2008.  
In the meantime, a second case, Hollander v. McCain, was filed in a 
New Hampshire federal district court. The plaintiff, Fred Hollander, is a 
registered Republican who alleged that he planned to vote in the 2008 elec-
tion. Hollander claimed that the nomination of a candidate who was 
ineligible to serve under Article II of the Constitution “disenfranchised” him 
and other voters. He sought not only a declaration of McCain’s ineligibility, 
but also an injunction requiring that McCain withdraw his candidacy and 
that the Republican National Committee reassign McCain’s delegates to 
other candidates and nominate a qualified candidate. The district court dis-
missed Hollander’s case, concluding that he presented only a “generalized 
interest” shared in common with other citizens that failed to satisfy the in-
jury-in-fact requirement for standing under Article III. 
The third federal case challenging McCain’s eligibility, Robinson v. 
Bowen, was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Cali-
fornia in August 2008. Plaintiff in that case, Markham Robinson, is the 
chairperson-elect of the American Independent Party (“AIP”) and a would-
be elector in support of the AIP’s candidate, Alan Keyes. Robinson thus as-
serted that he had a more direct interest than an ordinary voter. In particular, 
the complaint alleged that Robinson’s status as a potential presidential elec-
tor and chairperson-elect of a competing party was sufficient to confer 
standing. The district court nevertheless dismissed the case, concluding that 
Robinson lacked standing because he claimed no imminent and particular-
ized injury. In addition, the court concluded that the Electoral College 
process provided an appropriate means by which to resolve disputes over a 
presidential candidate’s eligibility. Referring to the process by which mem-
bers of Congress may raise objections to the counting of certain electoral 
votes, the court concluded that “[j]udicial review—if any—should occur 
only after the electoral and Congressional processes have run their course.”  
Another case challenged Senator Obama’s eligibility to serve as presi-
dent. The complaint in Berg v. Obama was filed in the U.S. District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania shortly before the 2008 Democratic 
National Convention. It alleged that Obama does not satisfy the Constitu-
tion’s natural born citizen requirement because he was born in Kenya, not 
Hawaii as he claims. The complaint also claimed that, by virtue of Obama’s 
moving to Indonesia with his mother as a child, he lost his U.S. citizenship. 
Although the  assertions in this complaint are extremely far-fetched, in the 
highly unlikely event that these allegations could be proven, they appear to 
present a strong argument against Obama’s eligibility. 
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II. Justiciability Problems with the Federal Lawsuits 
Under current case law, plaintiffs in the cases challenging the presiden-
tial candidates’ eligibility probably lack standing. In fact, it is questionable 
whether anyone  would have standing to challenge a presidential candidate’s 
eligibility in federal court as an initial matter, due to the prudential limita-
tions on standing. There is also a serious question about whether the suits 
should be deemed nonjusticiable under the political question doctrine. 
The three requirements for Article III standing are well-established and 
easy to state, though often more difficult to apply. First, as described in 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and other cases, the plaintiff must show an 
“injury in fact.” That requires that the injury be “concrete and particular-
ized” as well as “real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” There 
is no bright-line rule for ascertaining whether an injury is sufficiently immi-
nent to satisfy the injury-in-fact prong, but the Court has said that an 
asserted right to have the government act in accordance with the law is not 
sufficient. In Allen v. Wright, for example, the Court held that parents of 
black schoolchildren lacked standing to challenge the IRS’s failure ade-
quately to enforce its prohibition on tax exemptions to racially 
discriminatory private schools, holding that the “stigmatic” injury that plain-
tiffs claimed was too abstract. Second, plaintiff must show causation, 
meaning that the injury is “fairly traceable to the defendant’s allegedly 
unlawful conduct.” Third, plaintiff must establish redressability, meaning 
that a court is likely to remedy the injury by a favorable court decision.  
The injury-in-fact requirement is the most serious barrier to Article III 
standing in the presidential eligibility cases. To meet this requirement, plain-
tiffs must have a “personal stake” in the controversy that goes beyond that 
possessed by other members of the public. Thus, in Schlesinger v. Reservists 
Committee to Stop the War, the Court concluded that citizens lacked stand-
ing to enforce the constitutional prohibition on members of Congress 
serving in the executive branch. Such a “generalized interest of all citizens 
in constitutional governance” was insufficient. Under this precedent, the 
plaintiffs in Inland Empire Voters, Hollander, and Berg probably lack 
Article III standing.  
The plaintiff in Robinson, a would-be elector for a minor party 
candidate, has a somewhat stronger claim of injury than the plaintiffs in the 
other cases. But while his interest may be somewhat stronger than that of 
other members of the public, such a plaintiff still has a serious Article III 
standing problem. The chances of the candidate winning any electors from 
any state—whether or not McCain is in the race—are exceedingly remote. 
On occasion, the Court has found an impediment to competition sufficient to 
establish standing. There is also a Seventh Circuit case, Fulani v. Hogsett, in 
which a minor-party presidential candidate was held to have standing to 
challenge the certification of both major parties’ 1988 presidential 
candidates. In that case, however, the court found that the minor party 
candidate “could conceivably have won the Indiana election” if she obtained 
the relief sought. By contrast, Robinson’s preferred candidate Alan Keyes is 
TOKAJI FI FTP1 PAGINATED_C.DOC  9/30/2008 10:59 AM 
34 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 107:31 
 
exceedingly unlikely to win any electoral votes in California, even if 
McCain were disqualified. Robinson’s claim of injury is thus too speculative 
and insufficiently imminent to satisfy Article III, as the district court 
correctly concluded. 
Even if plaintiffs challenging the candidates’ eligibility could meet the 
requirements of Article III, they would still have to satisfy the prudential 
requirements for standing. Courts generally describe these as “judicially 
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.” While the precise 
boundaries of prudential standing remain nebulous, the Court in Elk Grove 
Unified School District v. Newdow defined it as encompassing three separate 
bars: (1) the general prohibition on raising another person’s legal rights, 
sometimes referred to as “third-party standing,” (2) the prohibition on the 
resolution of “generalized grievances” that should be addressed to the politi-
cal branches, and (3) the prohibition on hearing the claims outside the “zone 
of interests” protected by federal law. What unifies these strands of pruden-
tial standing, the Newdow Court explained (quoting Warth v. Seldin), is a 
concern that “courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of 
wide public significance even though other governmental institutions may 
be more competent to address the questions and even though judicial inter-
vention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.”  
Understood in this way, prudential standing presents formidable 
difficulties for these plaintiffs and, indeed, for anyone seeking to challenge a 
presidential candidates’ qualifications in federal court. The “generalized 
grievance” component of prudential standing is especially germane to the 
eligibility cases. This requirement partly overlaps with the injury-in-fact 
requirement of Article III, but it sweeps even more broadly.  The interest in 
not having a president who is eligible to serve is quintessentially 
“generalized,” since it is shared with every other American citizen. The 
Warth-Newdow language suggests that federal courts should be especially 
reluctant to find standing in cases asserting a “structural” constitutional 
violation—like the prohibition on members of Congress serving in the 
executive branch or the requirement that a president be a natural born 
citizen—as opposed to the violation of individual rights. As Dean Erwin 
Chemerinsky stated, such a broad reading of the generalized grievance 
requirement for prudential standing would “read these clauses out of the 
Constitution,” at least in terms of their enforceability through federal court 
lawsuits.  
This is not to say that prudential standing is lacking in all cases alleging 
structural violations. There are some cases in which a plaintiff would have a 
stronger claim to standing. That is particularly true of cases in which the 
interests of incumbent elected officials conflict with the interests of voters 
generally, and federal judicial intervention is necessary to correct self-
entrenching conduct. An example is Reynolds v. Sims and the “one person, 
one vote” line of cases or, more recently, partisan gerrymandering cases 
such as Vieth v. Jubelirer. Of course, these cases (unlike the eligibility cases) 
can at least be framed as involving individual rights to equal treatment. 
Moreover, there is an identifiable group of voters whose collective interests 
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are negatively affected by the challenged action. The same is not true in a 
challenge to a presidential candidate’s eligibility.  
Even if a court found a political party or its candidate to have some 
more pressing interest than the ordinary citizen, the question of institutional 
competence remains. Are federal courts the best institution, or at least an 
appropriate institution, to resolve this sort of dispute? If the answer to this 
question is no, then prudential standing would arguably bar not only minor 
parties and their candidates, but also major parties and their candidates. If 
Obama were to file a federal lawsuit challenging McCain’s eligibility, there 
would be a much stronger claim of injury than in a case brought by the AIP 
or its candidate. Obama could plausibly claim that he is suffering an injury 
that satisfies Article III through the diminution in his own chances to win 
Electoral College votes and, therefore, to become president. The more diffi-
cult obstacle for Obama would be prudential standing. The same would 
hold true in the extremely improbable event that McCain’s running mate, 
Governor Sarah Palin, were to file a federal lawsuit challenging his eligibil-
ity (either before or after the presidential election). It is at least open to 
question whether courts are institutionally competent to address this dispute, 
which does not clearly involve the protection of individual rights or self-
entrenching conduct by elected officials. If they are not, then it is quite pos-
sible that no one would satisfy the prudential standing requirements.  
I do not mean to overstate the argument against prudential standing, es-
pecially since the doctrine necessarily requires some discretionary 
judgments on the part of federal courts. The Court has not definitively pre-
cluded standing in cases that allege structural constitutional violations rather 
than violation of individual constitutional rights. Nor has it ruled on whether 
federal courts are institutionally competent to adjudicate the eligibility of a 
presidential candidate. But to decide this question, a federal court would 
have to consider whether there are other institutions better suited to resolve 
the question. I suspect that most federal judges would be strongly disin-
clined to take on the question of a presidential candidate’s eligibility if there 
were some other way of resolving the question. That would be especially 
true once the major parties’ chose their presumptive nominees through the 
primary and caucus processes. Citizens participating in this process, after 
all, have access to information regarding the circumstances of the candi-
dates’ birth. For a federal court to repudiate citizens’ choices of their 
preferred candidates would surely be seen as an arrogation of political 
power, to which Bush v. Gore would pale in comparison. It is hard to imag-
ine that many judges would be willing to go out on such a limb.  
This suggests another potential bar to the justiciability of a case chal-
lenging the eligibility of a political candidate: the political question 
doctrine. 
Under the political question doctrine, certain categories of cases—such 
as those alleging a violation of the Republican Guarantee Clause—are not 
justiciable in federal courts. This doctrine stems from the separation of pow-
ers, the idea being that the Constitution impliedly entrusts certain decisions 
to one or both of the political branches. The modern formulation of the test, 
TOKAJI FI FTP1 PAGINATED_C.DOC  9/30/2008 10:59 AM 
36 Michigan Law Review First Impressions [Vol. 107:31 
 
articulated in Baker v. Carr, looks in part to whether there is “a textually 
demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate politi-
cal department.” This is not exactly the same as saying that another 
institution is more competent to address the matter, but it is similar. A plain-
tiff seeking to challenge a presidential candidate’s qualifications would need 
to overcome the objection that this matter is textually committed to another 
branch.  
Powell v. McCormack is the political question case that presents the 
closest analogy to the presidential eligibility issue. In that case, the Court 
held that the House of Representatives’ decision to exclude a congressman 
who undisputedly met the qualifications set forth in Article I of the Consti-
tution did not present a political question. The power to exclude a qualified 
representative did not belong to Congress. Powell suggests, however, that a 
dispute over whether a member of Congress really did meet the constitu-
tional qualifications would be a nonjusticiable political question. Suppose, 
for example, there were a controversy over whether a newly elected con-
gresswoman were really twenty five years old, as the Constitution requires. 
Such a dispute would probably present a political question because the Con-
stitution confers on the House, not the federal courts, the power to judge 
whether its members meet the qualifications for service. If the same reason-
ing applies to presidential eligibility, then the determination whether 
McCain, Obama, or any other presidential candidate meets the constitutional 
requirements would be a nonjusticiable political question.  
Should the same reasoning apply to disputes over presidential qualifica-
tions? This depends on a question that I have so far avoided: whether there 
is some mechanism other than a lawsuit commenced in federal court for 
resolving the dispute. This question is vital to both the prudential standing 
and political question inquiries. For prudential standing, as stated in Warth 
and Newdow, the availability of an alternative mechanism is critical in as-
sessing whether there are “other governmental institutions may be more 
competent to address the question[].” The political question doctrine, as 
stated in Baker, similarly turns in part on whether the Constitution commits 
the matter to “a coordinate political department.” Although these are not the 
same tests, both of them depend in part on the alternative means by which a 
party may adjudicate a presidential candidates’ satisfaction of the constitu-
tional requirements—the question to which I now turn.  
III. Alternative Means of Adjudicating Presidential Eligibility 
There are two plausible alternative means by which a party may chal-
lenge the eligibility of a presidential candidate. The first is through a state-
court action filed under state election laws, seeking to prevent the election of 
an ineligible candidate. Conceivably, a party could file such an action either 
before or after an election, depending on what state law allows. The second 
possibility is that a member of Congress could challenge the eligibility of a 
presidential candidate as part of the process by which Congress counts the 
Electoral College votes. Both of these present, at least in some respects, 
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more satisfactory ways of resolving disputes over presidential eligibility 
than actions brought in federal court. 
Although the possibility for state-court litigation of a presidential candi-
date’s eligibility may seem counterintuitive, there is a good reason for 
believing that this sort of dispute belongs in state court. Article II, Section 1 
of the Constitution provides: “Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as 
the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole 
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled 
in the Congress.” In litigation surrounding the 2000 election, Bush’s legal 
team argued that the Florida Supreme Court violated this provision by fail-
ing to follow the Florida legislature’s instructions on post-election 
proceedings. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion in Bush v. Gore 
accepted this argument, concluding that the state supreme court’s construc-
tion of certain provisions of state election law went beyond the bounds of 
proper statutory interpretation. Yet none of the Justices disputed that state 
courts may hear cases alleging violations of state election statutes or that 
state courts generally possess the power to interpret and enforce those laws. 
State-court litigation might proceed as a lawsuit seeking to keep a presi-
dential candidate off the primary or general election ballot, on the ground 
that he or she does not satisfy the requisite qualifications. There exists some 
recent precedent for this type of case. In 2004, supporters of presidential 
candidate John Kerry brought a number of state-court actions seeking to 
deny Ralph Nader access to state ballots. In In re Nomination Papers of 
Nader, for example, registered voters in Pennsylvania filed suit in state 
court, seeking to have the names of independent candidate Nader and his 
running mate Peter Camejo excluded from the ballot. As in several other 
states, the objectors challenged the petition signatures submitted by the 
Nader-Camejo campaign. In addition, the Pennsylvania objectors argued 
that Nader and Camejo were not qualified to appear on the general election 
ballot by virtue of the state’s “sore loser” law, which prohibited candidates 
from running in a general election after running in state primaries. Although 
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that its statute did not in fact justify 
the exclusion of Nader and Camejo from the ballot, there was no doubt as to 
the state court’s ability to entertain a challenge to a presidential candidate’s 
qualifications in the course of determining whether to deny that candidate 
access to the state ballot. 
It is conceivable that a comparable state-court lawsuit could be filed, in 
Pennsylvania or another swing state, to challenge a presidential candidate’s 
constitutional qualifications to serve. There is no requirement that a plaintiff 
in a state-court lawsuit meet the Article III or prudential requirements for 
standing. Further, the federal political question doctrine does not bar state-
court litigation seeking to exclude a presidential candidate from the ballot 
on the ground that he or she is ineligible. It is also conceivable that a state-
court case challenging a presidential candidate’s eligibility could be brought 
after an election. State law might allow a post-election contest of primary or 
general election results on the ground that the candidate who gained the 
most votes does not meet the qualifications for office. A losing presidential 
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candidate could bring a contest petition in state court, seeking an order in-
validating the election results if state law allows such a remedy.  
There are obvious reasons why such post-election challenges would be 
undesirable. As Rick Hasen has argued in Beyond the Margin of Litigation, 
pre-election litigation is generally preferable to post-election litigation. It is 
generally better to resolve disputes before an election, allowing problems to 
be avoided in advance rather than putting courts in the difficult position of 
cleaning up the mess afterwards. This is particularly true in the context of a 
challenge to a presidential candidate’s qualifications. In the event that a can-
didate is deemed ineligible, the party could still put up a substitute. 
Of course, it is up to states—and, in particular, to state legislatures—to 
define the rights and remedies available in cases where a presidential candi-
date is alleged to be ineligible. There is certainly no constitutional 
requirement that the state provide either a pre-election remedy (such as de-
nial of ballot access) or a post-election remedy (like an order invalidating 
election results) for such disputes. But there remains no constitutional bar to 
such state-law remedies. In fact, such remedies would seem to fall squarely 
within what Article II contemplates in leaving it to state legislatures to de-
fine the manner by which presidential electors are appointed.  
A downside of such lawsuits is that they could lead to mischief and in-
consistency in the state courts. That is particularly true where members of 
one party or another dominate a state’s highest court. For example, a major-
ity of Florida’s judges were appointed by Democratic Governor Lawton 
Chiles, and Ohio’s supreme court currently is dominated by elected Repub-
lican justices. Suppose that a group of Florida voters brought a state-court 
action seeking to exclude McCain’s name from that state’s ballot on the 
ground that he is ineligible to serve. Alternatively, suppose that Ohio voters 
brought a state lawsuit attempting to knock Obama off the Ohio ballot, al-
leging that he is ineligible. Suppose further that the state supreme court in 
either state actually grants the relief requested, excluding the challenged 
candidate from the ballot on the ground that he is not a natural born citizen. 
Notwithstanding Article II’s language conferring authority on state legisla-
tures to appoint electors, the prospect of a renegade state court excluding a 
presidential candidate who is, in fact, qualified is enough to give one pause. 
It is also possible that state courts in different states could reach conflicting 
decisions on whether a challenged presidential candidate satisfies the eligi-
bility requirements in Article II.  
Fortunately, there would be an avenue for federal judicial review of such 
cases. Because the state court’s decision would rest on federal law—in this 
case Article II’s specification of the requirements to serve as president—the 
U.S. Supreme Court could hear the case on a petition for writ of certiorari. 
This is true even if the original state-court action would not have been justi-
ciable in federal court. In ASARCO v. Kadish, for example, the Court held 
that defendants who lost in state court could obtain U.S. Supreme Court 
review of federal issues decided against them, even though the original 
plaintiffs would not have had standing to bring the action in a federal court. 
The Court held that defendants had standing to seek Supreme Court review 
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on the theory that they had suffered an “injury” by virtue of the adverse 
state-court judgment against them. For similar reasons, if a candidate were 
removed from the Florida ballot as part of a state-court action, on the 
ground that he was constitutionally ineligible to serve as president, that can-
didate would presumably have standing to seek U.S. Supreme Court 
review—even if the original plaintiffs (the voters who sought to remove his 
name from the ballot) would not have had standing to sue in federal court as 
an initial matter. The prospect of U.S. Supreme Court review provides some 
assurance against a renegade state court rejecting a candidate who is eligible 
to be president, and against the possibility of two or more state courts reach-
ing different conclusions on the same presidential candidate’s eligibility.  
There is still a potential objection to Supreme Court review of a state-
court decision excluding or disqualifying a presidential candidate. A court 
may find that such a case presents a nonjusticiable political question be-
cause it is entrusted to another branch of the federal government. To 
evaluate this question, it is necessary to consider the other plausible option 
for adjudicating a presidential candidate’s qualifications: Congress making 
this determination during the process of counting Electoral College votes.  
As I described in a previous First Impressions commentary, the process 
for counting Electoral College votes is a product of both constitutional and 
statutory law. The constitutional requirements are set forth in Article II, sec-
tion 1, as modified by the Twelfth and Twentieth Amendments. In brief, the 
Constitution provides that the presidential electors, appointed as prescribed 
by the state legislature, are to meet in their respective states. The Electoral 
Count Act of 1887 sets the date for their meeting forty-one days after 
Election Day. The electors then send their votes to “the seat of the govern-
ment of the United States,” where “the votes shall then be counted.” The 
person who gains a majority of the electoral votes is elected president. The 
Electoral Count Act allows states to make objections in writing, if signed by 
at least one Senator and one member of the House. This act also includes the 
so-called “safe harbor” date: If state law provides for a final determination 
of controversies concerning the appointment of electors, and if such deter-
mination is made at least six days before the date fixed for the meeting of 
electors in the states (i.e., 35 days after Election Day, the “safe harbor 
date”), then Congress is required by statute to respect the state’s decision.  
Does Congress possess the power to adjudicate a dispute over a 
presidential candidate’s qualifications through this vote-counting process? 
The answer is not completely clear. On one hand, there is historical 
precedent for Congress exercising its power not to count electoral votes. In 
1873, three of Georgia’s electoral votes cast for Horace Greeley, who died 
after the November election but before the date the Electoral College met, 
were not counted. The Senate voted to count those votes while the House 
voted not to do so and, due to the nonconcurrence of the two chambers, the 
Greeley votes were not counted under a joint rule. In the event that there is a 
dispute over a president-elect’s qualifications to serve, it is conceivable that 
an objection could be made by at least one Senator and one member of the 
House, which Congress would then have to rule upon. On the other hand, 
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the process of counting the state electors’ votes is, arguably, purely 
ministerial. This is especially true for states that comply with the safe harbor 
deadline. As a matter of federal statutory law, those states are entitled to 
have their electoral votes counted, where controversies are resolved by the 
safe harbor date.  
Of course, Congress could simply refuse to comply with the safe harbor 
statute. Suppose, for example, that Colorado is the pivotal state in 2008, that 
it completes its post-election dispute resolution proceedings by the safe har-
bor date, and that it timely transmits its list of votes for McCain. Suppose 
further that Congress refuses to count those votes on the ground that 
McCain is ineligible and instead counts a competing slate sent by Obama’s 
electors, in plain violation of the federal safe harbor statute. What then? 
Would McCain have any legal recourse?  
A candidate in these circumstances would almost surely have Article III 
standing, as the party most directly injured by Congress’s failure to abide by 
federal law. The candidate would also have prudential standing, given that 
he would have suffered a particularized rather than a generalized injury, 
through its refusal to count the electoral votes to which he was arguably 
entitled. The big problem is the political question doctrine. The court might 
deem the question of how to count electoral votes as being entrusted to 
Congress’s unreviewable discretion, and therefore non-justiciable. It is very 
difficult to predict whether a federal court would intervene in such a night-
mare scenario, particularly given the slipperiness of the political question 
doctrine. The Twentieth Amendment adds to the confusion. It provides that 
“if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President 
elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified.” Unfortu-
nately, it does not explicitly say who is to make the determination whether a 
president elect has “failed to qualify,” and there is little scholarship on the 
subject. Vasan Kesavan’s article Is the Electoral Count Act Unconstitu-
tional? argues that the Constitution’s structure “suggests that neither the 
President nor Congress makes these determinations.” It is anyone’s guess, 
however, whether the Supreme Court would agree or whether it would deem 
this a nonjusticiable political question. 
The uncertainty over Congress’s power vis-à-vis the federal courts in 
this sphere magnifies the importance of state courts being open to those 
challenging a presidential candidate’s qualifications. There is little doubt 
that state legislatures have the power to define a process to adjudicate a 
presidential candidate’s qualifications, either through a denial of ballot ac-
cess or through some type of post-election proceeding. Given the legal 
uncertainty regarding Congress’s authority not to count the electoral votes 
of a candidate it believes ineligible, state-court litigation seems like the most 
appealing path for the resolution of such a dispute, with the possibility of 
review in the U.S. Supreme Court. Neither standing nor the political ques-
tion doctrine should serve as a barrier to such review.  
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Conclusion 
The current federal lawsuits challenging the presidential candidates’ eli-
gibility to serve as president are not justiciable, and it is questionable 
whether any justiciable case could be brought in federal court as an initial 
matter. Fortunately, there are alternative means to adjudicate this matter that 
are consistent with the U.S. Constitution. The most promising is a pre-
election state-court lawsuit seeking to keep an allegedly unqualified candi-
date off the ballot. In the event that a renegade state court rejects a candidate 
who is, in fact, eligible or that two or more state courts reach conflicting 
conclusions on a candidate’s eligibility, U.S. Supreme Court review should 
be available as a backstop. This avenue seems less fraught with peril than 
congressional resolution of the matter, given Congress’ dubious legal au-
thority to not count electoral votes of a candidate it believes ineligible. 
Those who seek to challenge a presidential candidate’s eligibility would 
thus be well-advised to dust off their state election codes and head to state 
court.  
